Summary: A Florida Hague Convention case generally decides where an international custody dispute should be heard—not which parent should ultimately receive custody. These cases move quickly, and early evidence preservation can be decisive.

International child-abduction cases can move with extraordinary speed. When a child is brought to or kept in Florida after living in another country, the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction may require a court to determine whether the child must be returned.

These proceedings are not conventional Florida custody cases. A court ordinarily does not decide which parent should receive custody or where the child would have a “better” life. It decides where the child was habitually resident, whether the child was wrongfully removed or retained, and whether a recognized exception permits the court to deny return.

Recent decisions from Florida federal courts and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit show how these principles operate—and why a parent on either side of an international child-abduction dispute should act immediately.

What is a Hague Convention child-abduction case?

The Hague Convention is an international treaty intended to deter parents from crossing national borders to obtain a perceived advantage in a custody dispute. Congress implemented the Convention through the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, commonly called ICARA. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–9011.

A parent may file a Hague Convention petition in a state or federal court authorized to exercise jurisdiction where the child is located. In Florida, many petitions are litigated in the United States District Courts for the Southern, Middle, or Northern District of Florida.

To obtain a return order, the petitioning parent generally must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:

Immediately before the removal or retention, the child was habitually resident in another country with which the Convention was in force as to the United States;
The removal or retention breached the petitioner’s custody rights under the law of that country; and
The petitioner was exercising—or would have exercised—those rights but for the removal or retention.

If the petitioner proves those elements, return is generally required unless the responding parent establishes a recognized exception. A return order determines the proper forum for custody litigation; it is not a custody award.

Bassat v. Dana: grave risk can arise without direct physical abuse of the child

Bassat v. Dana, No. 25-10915, 2025 WL 2304896 (11th Cir. Aug. 11, 2025) (unpublished).

In Bassat, the Eleventh Circuit reversed a Southern District of Florida order directing two children to return to Israel. The mother relied on the Article 13(b) grave-risk exception and presented evidence of violence and threats in the children’s presence, the children’s fear, and the psychological consequences of return.

The appellate court concluded that the district court had treated the evidence too narrowly by focusing on whether the father physically abused the children themselves. Grave psychological risk can exist when children witness violence or possess a well-grounded fear derived from their experience. The court also rejected the notion that risk necessarily disappears merely because the children might not be placed immediately in the allegedly abusive parent’s direct custody after return.

The decision provides several practical lessons:

Direct physical injury to the child is not the only evidence capable of proving grave risk.
Domestic violence witnessed within the family may create grave psychological harm.
A child’s fear can be probative when supported by the child’s experiences and other credible evidence.
The evidence must be assessed cumulatively rather than statement by statement in isolation.

Because Bassat is unpublished, it is persuasive rather than binding Eleventh Circuit authority. It nevertheless provides important recent guidance on the grave-risk defense in a case arising from a Florida federal court.

Read the decision: Bassat v. Dana

Goldstein v. Simon: habitual residence depends on the child’s actual life

Goldstein v. Simon, No. 24-12098, 2024 WL 4503767 (11th Cir. Sept. 25, 2024) (unpublished).

In Goldstein, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a mother’s petition seeking the return of three children to Israel. Following the October 2023 attack on Israel, the family relocated to Miami. The children enrolled in Florida schools, received medical care, participated in activities, and developed connections to their surroundings.

Applying the Supreme Court’s totality-of-the-circumstances test, the district court found that the United States had become the children’s habitual residence. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed under the deferential clear-error standard. The decision demonstrates that habitual residence is not dictated solely by citizenship, passports, a parent’s private intention, or the family’s prior home.

Courts may examine the child’s age, time in each country, schools, medical care, social and family connections, activities, language, immigration circumstances, personal belongings, and the reasons and plans surrounding a move. No single fact controls. The question is where the child was “at home” immediately before the alleged wrongful removal or retention.

Read the decision: Goldstein v. Simon

Quintero Jaimes v. Gil Tavera: a preference is not necessarily a mature-child objection

Quintero Jaimes v. Gil Tavera, No. 1:25-cv-22551-DPG (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2025).

The Southern District of Florida ordered an eleven-year-old child returned to Colombia. The responding parent relied in part on the mature-child exception, which permits—but does not compel—a court to deny return when a sufficiently mature child objects to returning.

The child’s expressed wishes had changed. At different times, the child wanted to return to Colombia and wanted to remain in the United States. The court found that the child was not sufficiently mature to navigate the parents’ competing wishes, promises of opportunity, and ties to both countries. It also was not convinced that the child genuinely objected to return, rather than simply preferring to remain in the United States.

Courts may consider the child’s age and emotional development, understanding of the decision, reasons, consistency, possible parental influence, and whether the child objects to the country of return or merely prefers one parent or lifestyle. Even if the exception is established, denying return remains discretionary.

Read the decision: Quintero Jaimes v. Gil Tavera

Llorente v. El Benaye: the one-year period can change the case

Llorente v. El Benaye, No. 1:25-cv-22582 (S.D. Fla. July 31, 2025).

In Llorente, the Southern District of Florida addressed children removed from Spain. The petitioner proved that Spain was their habitual residence, their removal breached his custody rights under Spanish law, and he was exercising those rights.

The case also illustrates why Article 12’s one-year period matters. If a proceeding begins within one year after a wrongful removal or retention, the Convention generally calls for return “forthwith,” subject to its exceptions. If proceedings begin after one year, the responding parent may additionally argue that the child is now settled in the new environment.

The Supreme Court has held that the one-year period is not equitably tolled merely because the removing parent concealed the child. Concealment can still bear on whether the child is actually settled, but it does not stop the one-year period from running. A parent seeking return should not delay locating the child, contacting the appropriate Central Authority, preserving evidence, or consulting counsel.

Read the decision: Llorente v. El Benaye

The Supreme Court rules controlling Florida cases

Monasky v. Taglieri: totality of the circumstances

In Monasky v. Taglieri, 589 U.S. 68 (2020), the Supreme Court held that habitual residence depends on the totality of the circumstances. An actual parental agreement is not invariably required, including for an infant. Florida courts therefore conduct a fact-intensive inquiry into where the child was genuinely at home.

Golan v. Saada: protective measures are not mandatory

In Golan v. Saada, 596 U.S. 666 (2022), the Court held that, after finding grave risk, a judge is not categorically required to examine every possible protective or “ameliorative” measure before denying return. A court may consider protective arrangements, but must remain attentive to the child’s safety, prompt resolution, practical enforceability abroad, and the danger of intruding into custody merits.

Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez: no equitable tolling

Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1 (2014), holds that Article 12’s one-year period is not equitably tolled. Concealment may affect whether the child is actually settled, but does not automatically extend the period.

Chafin v. Chafin: return does not automatically moot an appeal

In Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165 (2013), a case originating within the Eleventh Circuit, the Court held that an appeal does not become moot merely because the child has already been returned abroad. In practice, however, effective relief may become more difficult after departure, making an immediate request for a stay potentially critical.

What defenses may apply in a Florida Hague Convention case?

No qualifying habitual residence: the child was not habitually resident in the country identified by the petitioner immediately before the challenged conduct.
No custody right or exercise: the petitioner lacked a qualifying custody right or was not exercising it.
Consent or acquiescence: the petitioner consented to the move or later acquiesced in it.
Well-settled child: more than one year elapsed before proceedings began and the child is now settled in the new environment.
Mature-child objection: a sufficiently mature child genuinely objects to returning.
Grave risk: return would expose the child to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.
Fundamental principles: return would violate the requested state’s fundamental principles relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The burdens differ. Grave risk and the fundamental-principles exception generally require clear and convincing evidence. The petitioner’s prima facie case and exceptions involving consent, acquiescence, a mature child’s objection, and well-settled status generally use the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. Courts construe the exceptions narrowly. Even when an exception is proven, the Convention generally gives the court discretion rather than requiring it to refuse return.

What evidence is important?

Hague Convention cases are often tried under severe time pressure. Relevant proof may include:

Foreign custody orders, statutes, and competent evidence of foreign law;
Certified or otherwise reliable translations;
Passports, immigration documents, and travel records;
School, medical, counseling, and activity records;
Emails, texts, social-media messages, photographs, and recordings;
Evidence of the parents’ agreements, intentions, and later conduct;
Police, child-protection, and domestic-violence records;
Testimony from family members, teachers, clinicians, or other witnesses;
Psychological or medical expert testimony; and
Evidence concerning the availability, adequacy, and enforceability of protective measures abroad.

A prior criminal conviction or substantiated child-protection finding is not an express prerequisite to a grave-risk defense. The court evaluates the evidence admitted in the Hague proceeding under ICARA’s clear-and-convincing standard. Because credibility, corroboration, clinical evidence, and the precise risk created by return can be decisive, the proof should be developed immediately and carefully.

Attorney’s fees and costs can be substantial

If return is ordered, ICARA generally directs the court to award the successful petitioner necessary expenses—including legal fees, court costs, and transportation expenses—unless the respondent establishes that an award would be “clearly inappropriate.” 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3).

The Eleventh Circuit recognizes a strong presumption favoring fee shifting. Rath v. Marcoski, 898 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2018). A respondent bears a substantial burden to show why an award would be clearly inappropriate. Potential fee exposure should be evaluated at the beginning of the case, not after the evidentiary hearing.

How quickly do these cases move?

Very quickly. A court may promptly restrict travel, require surrender of passports, prohibit removal of the child from the district, authorize expedited service, or schedule an evidentiary hearing within weeks. A parent should preserve documents, avoid deleting electronic communications, obtain reliable translations, identify witnesses, and consult a lawyer experienced with Hague Convention and federal-court procedure immediately.

Frequently asked questions

Is a Hague Convention case the same as a Florida custody case?

No. A Hague court generally decides whether a child must be returned so that custody can be litigated in the proper country. It ordinarily does not decide which parent should ultimately receive custody.

Can a judge refuse return because life in Florida appears better?

Ordinarily, no. A general best-interests comparison is not a Convention defense. The responding parent must prove a recognized exception.

Does the Convention apply only when a child is secretly taken abroad?

No. It covers both wrongful removal and wrongful retention. A lawful vacation or temporary stay can become a wrongful retention when authorization ends and the child is not returned.

Does domestic violence matter if the child was not physically assaulted?

It can. Bassat illustrates that witnessed violence, credible threats, and a well-grounded fear may support grave psychological risk even without proof that the child was directly struck.

Can the child choose whether to return?

Not automatically. The judge considers whether the child genuinely objects and has sufficient age and maturity, as well as the reasons, consistency, and possible parental influence. Even then, refusal of return is discretionary.

Can a Hague Convention petition be filed in Florida state court?

Yes. ICARA gives state and federal courts concurrent jurisdiction. Many cases are filed in federal court because the claim arises under a federal statute implementing an international treaty.

What happens if the child is returned while an appeal is pending?

The appeal does not automatically become moot, but meaningful relief may become more difficult. A party seeking to prevent return during appellate review may need an immediate stay.

How soon should I speak with a lawyer?

Immediately. One year can affect the available defenses, and Florida courts frequently handle return petitions on expedited schedules. Delay can also result in lost messages, unavailable witnesses, or inadequate time to retain an expert.

Speak with a Florida Hague Convention Child Abduction Lawyer

International child-abduction cases demand immediate, focused action. The governing rules are specialized, the evidentiary burdens can be demanding, and a court may schedule a final evidentiary hearing on an expedited basis.

Our firm represents parents in Hague Convention and ICARA proceedings involving children located in Florida or anywhere else in the United States who were allegedly removed from another country. We represent both petitioning parents seeking return of their children and responding parents asserting exceptions including grave risk, consent, acquiescence, a mature child’s objection, and well-settled status to keep their children with them here in the United States.

To discuss a potential Hague Convention international child-abduction case, contact our office using the telephone number or confidential online contact form provided on this website.

IMPORTANT If passports are at issue or a return hearing is set, tell counsel immediately; emergency relief may require same-day action.

This article provides general information and is not legal advice. Reading it or contacting the firm does not create an attorney-client relationship. Hague Convention cases are highly fact-specific, and past results do not guarantee a similar outcome.